Patocka's asubjective reply to Husserl's and Heidegger's Cartesianism

Abstract

Jan Patočka begins a fundamental analysis of a-subjective phenomenology according to which
the philosophies of Husserl and Heidegger did not entirely succeed in overcoming Cartesianism.
In qddition, these philosophers did not give the same answers to the question of the ultimate foundation
of the appearance as such. The author of this essay therefore examines their contradictions in some detail.
More specifically, it aims to demonstrate the importance of Patočka's critiques for understanding
his non-Cartesian doctrine of a-subjective phenomenology which actually arose in opposition
to the apparent inadequacies of both Husserl and Heidegger. The reader can now see in detail
how Patočka himself seeks to remedy this in his later thought and how one can escape the peril of subjectivism.
With these considerations in the background, this paper presents asubjective phenomenology
as a viable and relevant philosophical methodology.